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2019 / Litigation for the Era of Extreme Weather
“By the law of nature these things are common to all mankind—the air, running
water, the sea, and consequently the shores of the sea.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
For decades, scientists have predicted that human-caused climate change will
make natural disasters more extreme and commonplace. 2 Everyone contributes to
climate change, but an ascertainable few have done far more to stifle debate, slow
the switch to alternative energy, and raise global temperatures, making them the
ideal defendants for the impending wave of climate change litigation. 3
These ideal defendants, collectively referred to here as “Carbon Majors,” have
been so successful that in 2019, the United States is still heavily subsidizing their
operations and refusing to respond in a rational way to climate change. 4 Given that
the “point of no return” is either imminent or has already passed, 5 and the U.S.

1. J. INST. 2.1.1.
2. Current
Extreme
Weather
& Climate Change:
Overview,
CLIMATE COMMC’N,
https://www.climatecommunication.org/new/features/extreme-weather/overview/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017) (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Ker Than, Scientists: Natural Disasters Becoming More
Common, LIVE SCIENCE (Oct. 17, 2005), https://www.livescience.com/414-scientists-natural-disasterscommon.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“According to the EM-DAT, the total
natural disasters reported each year has been steadily increasing in recent decades, from 78 in 1970 to 348 in
2004.”).
3. See Dan Drollette Jr., Just 90 Companies Are Accountable For More Than 60 Percent of Greenhouse
Gases, THE BULLETIN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/just-90-companies-are-accountable-more-60percent-greenhouse-gases10080 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how just 90
entities are responsible for 63% of all industrial carbon dioxide [CO2] and methane emissions); and see Oliver
Milman, Oil Industry Knew of ‘Serious’ Climate Concerns More Than 45 Years Ago, THE GUARDIAN (Apr. 13,
2016, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/13/climate-change-oil-industry-environmentwarning-1968 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (reporting that in 1968, the Stanford
Research Institute had warned in a report about the serious consequences of climate change, which the president
of the Center for International Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil
industry worked to actively undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action
even as its own knowledge of climate risks was growing.”).
4. Damien Carrington, Fossil Fuels Subsidised by $10m a Minute, Says IMF, THE GUARDIAN (May 18,
2015, 9:30 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/may/18/fossil-fuel-companies-getting-10m-aminute-in-subsidies-says-imf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that
internationally, governments spend an estimated $10 million a minute on fossil fuels).
5. See Richard Harris, Global Warming is Irreversible, Study Says, NPR (Jan. 26, 2009, 4:49 PM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=99888903 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (citing NOAA: “[C]limate change is essentially irreversible.”); and see Earl J. Ritchie, Have We Passed
the Climate Change Tipping Point?, FORBES (Mar. 16, 2017, 6:04 PM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/uhenergy/
2017/03/16/have-we-passed-the-climate-change-tipping point/#73a9f1cb7e12 (on file with The University of the
Pacific Law Review) (“A few years ago, 400 [ppm of CO2] was widely cited as the tipping point for climate
change. Now that we have passed that value, it has become common to say that it wasn’t really a tipping point,
that it was symbolic or a milestone. Whether it’s a tipping point or a milestone, we have decisively passed it and
CO2 levels appear certain to continue higher.”); but see EarthTalk, Have We Passed the Point of No Return on
Climate Change?, SCI. AM. (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/have-we-passed-thepoint-of-no-return-on-climate-change/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“While we may
not yet have reached the ‘point of no return’—when no amount of cutbacks on greenhouse gas emissions will
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Government’s response is to embark on a “Road to Repeal,” 6 climate change
litigation will prove to be the most effective way to respond to the coming age of
extreme weather.
Advances in climate modeling now allow scientists to calculate anthropogenic
climate change’s effect on the severity and frequency of natural disasters. These
models provide an ascertainable nexus between the destruction of a private
citizen’s home by an extreme weather event, for instance, and rising temperatures. 7
Years of data and advances in event attribution analysis also allow for quantifiable
apportionment of gigatons of carbon (GtC) as emitted by individual actors in the
fossil fuel industry. 8 The amount of GtC emitted by the fossil fuel industry
constitutes enough of the total anthropogenic GtC in the atmosphere to justify
singling out this sector in particular.9 When viewed in light of the industry’s
intentional misconduct of suppressing climate science and preventing meaningful
policy change, 10 plaintiffs seeking to sue the industry have a meritorious cause of
action under the common law tort theory of negligence. Further, private citizens
and not state or local governments must litigate this issue, through the common
law rather than statutes, to avoid jurisdictional barriers of environmental law,
minimize political manipulation of the outcome, and ensure that private citizens
themselves can be made whole. 11
This Comment is a drop in the bucket of numerous scholarly writings that

save us from potentially catastrophic global warming—climate scientists warn we may be getting awfully
close.”).
6. ‘A Road to Repeal’ Document, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/
02/04/us/doc-lobby.html [hereinafter Road to Repeal Document] (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
7. John Vidal, Storm Desmond Rainfall Partly Due to Climate Change, Scientists Conclude, THE
GUARDIAN (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2015/dec/11/storm-desmond-rainfallflooding-partly-due-to-climate-change-scientists-conclude (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (“Researchers ran climate modeling experiments and found that climate change made flooding 40% more
likely.”).
8. RICHARD HEEDE, CLIMATE MITIGATION SERVS., CARBON MAJORS: ACCOUNTING FOR CARBON AND
METHANE EMISSIONS 1854–2010 METHODS & RESULTS REPORT (Apr. 7, 2014), available at
http://climateaccountability.org/pdf/MRR%209.1%20Apr14R.pdf (on file with The University of Pacific Law
Review).
9. Dan Drollette Jr., Just 90 Companies Are Accountable for More Than 60 Percent of Greenhouse Gases,
THE BULLETIN (Oct. 27, 2016), https://thebulletin.org/just-90-companies-are-accountable-more-60-percentgreenhouse-gases10080 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how just 90 entities
are responsible for 63% of all industrial CO2 and methane emissions).
10. See Oliver Milman, Oil Industry Knew of ‘Serious’ Climate Concerns More Than 45 Years Ago, THE
GUARDIAN (Apr. 13, 2016, 1:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2016/apr/13/climate-change-oilindustry-environment-warning-1968 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining that the
Stanford Research Institute presented a report about the serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which
the president of the Center for International Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence
that the oil industry worked to actively undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate
action even as its own knowledge of climate risks was growing.”).
11. See infra Parts IV.A–B.
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parse out the concept of climate change litigation. 12 Yet recent developments, the
magnitude of harm involved in climate change, and the risk that issue preclusion
will prohibit novel and effective theories of recovery, all merit an updated
discussion of the legal remedies available. 13 Importantly, the legal analysis
concerning the most fundamental issue for climate litigants—displacement and
preemption by federal air quality laws—may be altered by the current
Administration’s retreat from the area it supposedly occupies, i.e. the area of
greenhouse gas regulation. 14
Part II provides a brief scientific overview of the basic principles of climate
change15 and a short summary of how political bribery by the fossil fuel industry
and other U.S. Government inaction has concealed and muddied the scientific
evidence.16 Part III discusses the legal background of environmental litigation, 17
and then uses a comparative approach to assess the successes and failures of
litigation with other, non-environmental industries like tobacco and
pharmaceuticals.18 Part IV uses the principles delineated from the prior sections to
develop a coherent litigation strategy that can avoid the barriers facing similarly
situated plaintiffs. 19
II. BASIC SCIENTIFIC BACKGROUND
This Part lays out the basic principles of climate change, beginning in Section
A with an explanation of the vital role greenhouse gases play in regulating
climate.20 Section B summarizes the political history of climate change—that is,
the rejection of scientific projection through misinformation, concealment, and
political bribery.21
A. What Are Greenhouse Gases (GHGs)?
The terms “global warming” or “climate change” refer to the accelerated rate
at which the planet is heating up due to the accumulation of greenhouse gases
12. Mary Christina Wood & Dan Galpern, Atmospheric Recovery Litigation: Making the Fossil Fuel
Industry Pay to Restore a Viable Climate System, 45 ENVTL. L. 259 (2015); David A. Grossman, Warming Up to
a Not-So-Radical Idea: Tort-Based Climate Litigation, 28 COLUM. J. ENVTL. L. 1 (2003); David Hunter & James
Salzman, Negligence in the Air: The Duty of Care in Climate Change Litigation, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1757
(2007).
13. Infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part IV.B.1.
15. Infra Part II.
16. Infra Part II.B.
17. Infra Part III.
18. Infra Part III.B.
19. Infra Part IV.
20. Infra Part II.A.
21. Infra Part II.B.
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(GHGs) in the atmosphere. 22 GHGs—including carbon dioxide (CO2), methane
(CH4), ozone (O3), and water vapor (H2O)—absorb sun rays reflecting off Earth’s
surface and then reflect them back. This traps heat in the atmosphere like the walls
of a greenhouse. 23 Large amounts of greenhouse gases are present in the
atmosphere naturally; animals (including humans) release CO2 when breathing, 24
volcanic eruptions release anywhere up to 440 million tons of CO2 a year,25 and
water vapor is always present in the atmosphere through evaporation of Earth’s
surface water.26 Having been regulated by photosynthetic and other natural
processes up until the industrial era,27 anthropogenic (human-caused) events have
rapidly increased concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere causing accelerated
warming of the Earth’s surface and oceans.28
Scientists predict that the rapid rate at which the temperature is rising will
cause devastating global impacts; i.e., if we continue to pump carbon into the air,
which has a linear relationship to temperature, we can expect the climate to deviate
from its normal range as regulated by natural processes, and start acting in a more
extreme, chaotic fashion. 29 Giving credence to this notion, a National Oceanic and
Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) report stated:
The years 2017 and 2016 each had a historically high number of billiondollar disasters that impacted the U.S. (16 and 15 events, respectively).
However, in 2017, the U.S. experienced a rare combination of high
disaster frequency, disaster cost, and diversity of weather and climate
extreme events.30

22. Amanda MacMillan, Global Warming 101, NAT. RES. DEF. COUNCIL (Mar. 11, 2016),
https://www.nrdc.org/stories/global-warming-101 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
23. What Are Greenhouse Gases?, NAT’L CTRS FOR ENVTL. INFO., https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/monitoring
-references/faq/greenhouse-gases.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review).
24. Food Factories, LEGACY PROJECT, http://www.legacyproject.org/activities/foodfactories.html (last
visited Nov. 4, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
25. Volcanic Gases Can Be Harmful to Health, Vegetation and Infrastructure, U.S. GEOLOGICAL S URV.,
https://volcanoes.usgs.gov/vhp/gas.html (last visited Nov. 10, 2017) (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review).
26. What Are Greenhouse Gases?, supra note 23.
27. Id.
28. INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: SYNTHESIS REPORT
(Rajendra K.R Pachauri & Leo Meyer eds., 2014), available at http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessmentreport/ar5/syr/
AR5_SYR_FINAL_SPM.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“Human influence on the
climate system is clear, and recent anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases are the highest in history.”).
29. Carbon Emissions Linked to Global Warming in Simple Linear Relationship, SCI. DAILY,
https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2009/06/090610154453.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
30. Adam B. Smith, 2017 U.S. Billion-Dollar Weather and Climate Disasters: A Historic Year in Context,
NAT’L OCEANOGRAPHIC ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Jan. 8, 2018), https://www.climate.gov/newsfeatures/blogs/beyond-data/2017-us-billion-dollar-weather-and-climate-disasters-historic-year (on file with The
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Among other factors such as an “increase in population and material wealth,”
NOAA attributed this trend to climate change, which, it noted “[increases]
vulnerability to drought, lengthen[s] wildfire seasons and the potential for
extremely heavy rainfall and inland flooding events.” 31
B. American Climate Denial: A Brief History
Drought, wildfire, and increased flooding are verifiable effects of climate
change that will continue to occur given our current understanding of physics and
chemistry.32 In addition, the ability to predict how rising temperatures will
destabilize the climate and cause more extreme weather patterns has existed for
decades without any serious disagreement. 33
Yet these well-established scientific findings have not been consistently
accepted and reacted to accordingly. 34 For example, scientists and politicians alike
decried the Bush Administration’s handling of climate science in what the Union
of Concerned Scientists characterized as “manipulation, suppression, and
misrepresentation of science.” 35 After President Barack Obama took office, the oil
and gas sector’s lobbying expenditures broke records.36 A study of campaign
spending found that the four largest 501(c)(4) groups (including the American
Energy Alliance, David Koch’s Americans for Propensity, and Karl Rove’s
Crossroads GPS) spent nearly $30 million on campaign ads, 85 percent of which
contained at least one deceptive claim. 37

University of the Pacific Law Review).
31. Id.
32. Thomas C. Peterson, William M. Connolley & John Fleck, The Myth of the 1970s Global Cooling
Scientific Consensus, AM. METEOROLOGICAL SOC’Y 1328 (Sept. 2008), available at http://journals.ametsoc.org
/doi/pdf/10.1175/2008BAMS2370.1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
33. Id. (explaining how in 1975, newly developed climate modeling technology was able to lead to the
“resounding” conclusion that global warming existed).
34. See, e.g., Investigating the Bush Administration’s Misuse of Science, MIT W. HEMISPHERE PROJECT,
http://web.mit.edu/hemisphere/events/bushscience.shtml (last visited Jan. 6, 2018) (on file with The University of
the Pacific Law Review).
35. Id. The findings of the Union of Concerned Scientists were as follows:
(1) High-ranking political appointees in the Bush Administration have repeatedly suppressed &
distorted scientific findings, with adverse consequences for human health, public safety, & community
well-being. (2) The federal government’s scientific advisory system has been manipulated to prevent
the appearance of advice that might embarrass the Administration or stand in the way of its political
agenda. (3) The Administration imposes restrictions on what government scientists can say or write
about “sensitive” topics. And (4) The scope & scale of the manipulation, suppression, &
misrepresentation of science by the Bush Administration appears to be unprecedented.
Id.
36. Anne C. Mulkern, Oil and Gas Interests Set Spending Record for Lobbying in 2009, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
2, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/gwire/2010/02/02/02greenwire-oil-and-gas-interests-set-spending-record-forl-1504.html?pagewanted=all (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting how Big Oil spent
“at least $154 million on lobbying,” which was up 16 percent from the previous year).
37. High Percent of Presidential Ad Dollars of Top Four 501(c)(4)s Backed Ads Containing Deception,
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Today, the Trump Administration’s Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
Administrator, Scott Wheeler (a former coal lobbyist) does not consider climate
change to be a top priority.38 This Administration has aggressively pursued
deregulation of corporate polluters through executive action, 39 withdrawal from
the Paris Climate Accord, and appointment of EPA Administrators who do not
recognize the urgent need for immediate reduction of CO2.40
Political manipulation has successfully perpetuated an anti-science aura within
the United States; in fact, a Gallup poll revealed that only 42% of Republicans
believe that the scientific community agrees about climate change—an 11 point
drop from when Trump took office in 2017. 41 Thus, there is a long history of
opposition to climate change science by both the U.S. Government and the
massively profitable Carbon Majors that have shaped policy directly and confused
the public.42
Because this dysfunctional government and confused public has precluded the
necessary policy changes, extreme weather events such as the California wildfires,
and Hurricanes Maria, Irma, and Harvey will only become progressively worse. 43
It is unclear when proportional action will be taken, particularly when legislators
continue to gut numerous regulations aimed at reducing coal emissions, water
pollution, and methane on the Road to Repeal.44 In the interim, private citizens
should use the court system to protect themselves financially in the wake of more
extreme weather. 45
Annenberg Study Finds, ANNENBERG P UB. POL’Y CTR. (June 20, 2012), https://www.annenbergpublicpolicycent
er.org/high-percent-of-presidential-ad-dollars-of-top-four-501c4s-backed-ads-containing-deception-annenbergstudy-finds/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“From December 1, 2011 through June 1,
2012, the four top presidential campaign spending 501(c)(4)s spent an estimated $24.9 million ($24,916,690) of
their $29.3 million ($29,320,110) presidential ad dollars on ads containing deceptions.”).
38. Amy Gunia, EPA Chief Says Climate Change Is Not His Top Priority, TIME (Apr. 12, 2019),
http://time.com/5569214/epa-chief-andrew-wheeler-climate-change/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (noting how Wheeler expressed doubt over studies indicating the urgent need for climate action).
39. Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6.
40. Eric Lipton, Energy Firms in Secretive Alliance with Attorneys General, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/12/07/us/politics/energy-firms-in-secretive-alliance-with-attorneys-general.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review); Brad Plumer, Scott Pruitt, E.P.A. Chief, Rented Residence
From Wife of Energy Lobbyist, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/03/30/climate/scottpruitt-epa-rental.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
41. Megan Brenan & Lydia Saad, Global Warming Concern Steady Despite Some Partisan Shifts, G ALLOP
(Mar.
28,
2018),
http://news.gallup.com/poll/231530/global-warming-concern-steady-despite-partisanshifts.aspx?version=print (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
42. Gunia, supra note 38; Robinson Meyer, Trump’s EPA Chief Denies the Basic Science of Climate
Change, THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 9, 2017), https://www.theatlantic.com/science/archive/2017/03/trumps-epa-chiefrejects-that-carbon-dioxide-emissions-cause-climate-change/519054/ (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (quoting Scott Pruitt: “[T]here’s “tremendous disagreement about the degree of [CO2’s] impact [on
the climate] . . . I would not agree that it’s a primary contributor to the global warming that we see.”).
43. CLIMATE COMMC’N, supra note 2; Than, supra note 2 (“According to the EM-DAT, the total natural
disasters reported each year has been steadily increasing in recent decades, from 78 in 1970 to 348 in 2004.”).
44. Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6.
45. See infra Part IV.A.1 (discussing private citizens’ role in climate change litigation).
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III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Sufferers of environmental harm tend to have limited options in pursuing
redress.46 Most environmental statutes like the Clean Water Act (CWA) and Clean
Air Act (CAA) have citizen suit provisions written directly into the statute, 47
allowing private citizens to sue persons in violation of the Act, 48 or the
governmental agency charged with implementing it. 49 Plaintiffs can also challenge
agency action under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), which generally
gives any person who has “suffer[ed] legal wrong” or was “adversely affected or
aggrieved by agency action” the ability to file suit directly with a district court.50
Either way, plaintiffs seeking redress in any court—even when there are statutory
mechanisms for such a suit—are constrained by the justiciability problem. 51
This Part begins by discussing the problems of justiciability in environmental
litigation.52 Section B then looks outside environmental law, namely to the tobacco
and pharmaceutical industries, to identify areas that plaintiffs damaged by extreme
weather can borrow from in shaping an ideal litigation strategy.53
A. Justiciability in Federal Courts
The justiciability doctrine encompasses the various requirements that limit a
court’s ability to hear a particular case.54 It carries prudential and pragmatic
requirements designed to prevent judicial encroachment into matters reserved to
other political branches.55 As a general matter, this requirement involves

46. Jonathan H. Adler, Stand or Deliver: Citizen Suits, Standing, and Environmental Protection, 12 DUKE
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 39, 40 (2001).
47. Id. at 42.
48. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C.A. § 1365(a)(1) (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) (granting the right to sue
“any person . . . who is alleged to be in violation of [this Act].”).
49. See, e.g., id. § 1365(a)(2) (granting the right to sue the “Administrator where there is alleged a failure
of the Administrator to perform any act or duty under this [Act] which is not discretionary with the
Administrator.”).
50. 5 U.S.C.A. § 702 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
51. See infra Part III.A.
52. Infra Part III.A.
53. Infra Part III.B.
54. Justiciability, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (defining justiciability as “the quality, state,
or condition of being appropriate or suitable for adjudication by a court”).
55. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Vander Jagt v. O’Neill, 699 F.2d 1166, 1178
(D.C. Cir. 1983)).
All of the doctrines that cluster about Article III—not only standing but mootness, ripeness, political
question, and the like—relate in part, and in different though overlapping ways, to an idea, which is
more than an intuition but less than a rigorous and explicit theory, about the constitutional and
prudential limits to the powers of an unelected, unrepresentative judiciary in our kind of government.
Id.
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consideration of the pertinent legal issues,56 involved parties,57 and timing of the
case.58 These requirements will differ according to the desired jurisdiction; as such,
a case that is justiciable in a state court may not be justiciable in federal courts. 59
Subsection 1 discusses the aspect of justiciability focused on “who” is bringing
the lawsuit, known as the Standing Doctrine.60 Subsections 2, 3, and 4 then address
those aspects focused on the underlying legal issues involved—the displacement
of federal common law, 61 preemption,62 and the political question doctrine, 63
respectively.
1. Standing
The U.S. Constitution limits the jurisdiction of federal courts, 64 permitting
only those lawsuits brought by plaintiffs who have “standing to sue.” This standard
will bar plaintiffs who cannot show: (1) an “injury in fact” that is “concrete and
particularized” and “actual or imminent;” (2) “a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of”; and (3) a likelihood “that the injury will be
redressed by a favorable decision.” 65 This has prevented various environmental
harm claims from proceeding on the merits, typically for failure to meet the
causation element.66 States acting as plaintiffs, on the other hand, appear to have a
56. See Powell, 395 U.S. at 512–13 (“A federal district court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter (1)
if the cause does not ‘arise under’ the federal Constitution, laws, or treaties (or fall within one of the other
enumerated categories of U.S. Const. Art. III); or (2) if it is not a ‘case or controversy’ within the meaning of that
phrase in Art. III; or (3) if the cause is not one described by any jurisdictional statute.”).
57. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 739, 751 (describing the standing doctrine as encompassing “several judicially
self-imposed limits on the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such as the general prohibition on a litigant’s raising
another person’s legal rights, the rule barring adjudication of generalized grievances more appropriately addressed
in the representative branches, and the requirement that a plaintiff’s complaint fall within the zone of interests
protected by the law invoked . . . [The core component is] the plaintiff must allege personal injury fairly traceable
to the defendant’s allegedly unlawful conduct and likely to be redressed by the requested relief.”).
58. See Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, 496 (1969) (explaining that a case will become “moot” when
“the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a legally cognizable interest in the outcome”).
59. See Wright, 468 U.S. at 750 (suing in federal court requires Article III standing).
60. Infra Part III.A.1.
61. Infra Part III.A.2.
62. Infra Part III.A.3.
63. Infra Part III.A.4.
64. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the
Laws of the United States . . . to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party . . . between
two or more States; between a State and Citizens of another State; between Citizens of different States;
between citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a
State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
Id.
65. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992).
66. See, e.g., Wash. Envtl. Council v. Bellon, 732 F.3d 1131, 1143–44 (9th Cir. 2013). In finding the
plaintiffs lacked standing to compel the state’s EPA to regulate the state’s oil refineries, the court noted:
[I]t is not possible to quantify a causal link, in any generally accepted scientific way, between GHG
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significant upper hand in establishing Article III standing as a result of their “quasisovereign interests,”67 but as is argued herein, private citizens should still
undertake this litigation on their own behalf.
In essence, it is the global and nebulous nature of climate-related claims that
has prevented plaintiffs from establishing the causation needed for standing. 68 As
will be discussed in Part IV, 69 judicial hesitation to apportion liability is now belied
by accurate methods to attribute GHG emissions to particular actors. Nonetheless,
even recognizing event attribution analyses as a means of establishing causation
can speak only to the “who” aspect of justiciability—whether the plaintiff has
standing to sue in federal courts. 70
2. Displacement of Federal Common Law
The “what” aspect (which claims a plaintiff can pursue) is similarly
contentious by virtue of the statutory framework already in place,71 and the
exceedingly political nature of environmental law in general.
Codification of environmental law occurred relatively recently and virtually
all at once; in an eco-conscious fervor, laws passed in the 1970’s included the
Clean Air Act (CAA),72 the Clean Water Act (CWA),73 and the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).74 Various wakeup calls helped shift the
American zeitgeist to garner the requisite political capital: pollution was so severe
that rivers caught fire, 75 and city smog became so poisonous it killed dozens.76

emissions from any single oil refinery in Washington, or the collective emissions of all five oil
refineries located in Washington, and direct, indirect or cumulative effects on global climate change
in Washington or anywhere else.
Id.
67. See Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *3 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Congress has . . . recognized a concomitant procedural right to challenge the rejection of its
rulemaking petition as arbitrary and capricious. Given that procedural right and Massachusetts’ stake in protecting
its quasi-sovereign interests, the Commonwealth is entitled to special solicitude in our standing analysis” (internal
citations omitted)).
68. Bellon, 732 F.3d at 1144.
69. Infra Part IV.
70. See infra Part III.A.2.
71. See, e.g., Clean Air Act of 1970, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140)
(representing one federal law that could potentially preclude climate change claims on preemption grounds).
72. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401–7671q (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
73. 33 U.S.C.A. §§ 1251–1388 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
74. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 4321–4370m (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
75. Jennifer Latson, The Burning River that Sparked a Revolution, TIME (June 22, 2015),
http://time.com/3921976/cuyahoga-fire/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (commemorating
the anniversary of Cleveland’s Cuyahoga River bursting into flames on June 22, 1969, and noting how it sparked
the passage of the Clean Water Act).
76. Ann Murray, Smog Deaths in 1948 Led to Clean Air Laws, NPR (Apr. 22, 2008, 9:43 AM),
https://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=103359330 (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (detailing the events of October 27, 1948, where 20 people died and “half the town was sick” as a
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However, this legislative framework—at least in the context of climate change
litigation—operates as more of an obstacle than a crutch for plaintiffs. 77
Importantly, the CAA, as well as relevant state iterations of the same, have caused
several cases to fail as a result of displacement. 78
Federal courts’ ability to create common law has been constrained by the
fundamental understanding of Erie, namely that substantive law, unless in the form
of federal statute or constitutional directive, should be fashioned by the states. 79
The Erie Doctrine suggests that federal common lawmaking is warranted only in
rare situations, and must relate to matters within “national legislative power where
Congress has so directed or where the basic scheme of the Constitution so
demands.” 80 To wit: “issues of national concern.”81 It is no longer true that there
“is no federal common law;”82 there is, and it includes matters of “air and water in
their ambient or interstate aspects.” 83 Thus, for matters pertaining to climate
change, federal common law can only be fashioned where Congress has “not
spoken to a particular issue.” 84
The CAA established a comprehensive scheme for the national regulation of
hazardous air pollutants, 85 motor vehicle emissions, 86 and the promulgation of
ambient air quality standards. 87 The Act requires the EPA administrator to set
“standards applicable to the emission of any air pollutant from . . . new motor
vehicles . . . which in [the Administrator’s] judgment cause[s], or contribute[s] to,
air pollution . . . reasonably . . . anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.” 88
Further, although states generally cannot regulate new motor vehicle emissions 89
and their standards cannot be “less stringent” than those set out federally, 90 the
CAA gives states the “primary responsibility” for “assuring air quality within the

result of industrial pollution).
77. Adler, supra note 46, at 84.
78. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (finding the federal common law
displaced plaintiff’s claims seeking abatement).
79. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
80. Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 421 (2011) (citing Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—
And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383, 408 n. 119, 421–22 (1964) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
81. Henry J. Friendly, In Praise of Erie—And of the New Federal Common Law, 39 N.Y.U. L. REV. 383,
405 (1964).
82. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
83. Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 103 (1972).
84. Milwaukee v. Ill., 451 U.S. 304, 313 (1981).
85. CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 7401, 7412 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140).
86. Id. § 7521; Nat’l Audubon Soc’y v. Dept. of Water, 869 F.2d 1196, 1202 (9th Cir. 1988).
87. Id. §§ 7408–7409.
88. Id. § 7521(a)(1).
89. Id. § 7543 (“No State or any political subdivision thereof shall adopt or attempt to enforce any standard
relating to the control of emissions from new motor vehicles or new motor vehicle engines subject to this part.”).
90. Id. § 7416.
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entire geographic area comprising such state.” 91
Massachusetts v. EPA confirmed that GHGs fit within the Act’s “capacious
definition of air pollutant,” and as a result, held that the CAA authorizes the EPA
to regulate them. 92 This led the Supreme Court to conclude that Congress had
“directly addressed the issue of domestic greenhouse gas emissions … [and]
therefore displaced federal common law” in American Electric Power Co., Inc. v.
Connecticut (AEP).”93
In AEP, eight states, New York City, and several land trusts sued in federal
district court seeking to put an emissions cap on five of the state’s largest CO2
emitters, to be reduced annually, under a federal common law public nuisance
theory.94 The Supreme Court refused to do so, citing the CAA’s occupation of the
field of GHG regulation, which it said displaced plaintiffs’ federal common law
nuisance claims.95
Interestingly, the EPA had not yet begun exercising its regulatory authority
over GHGs at the time the AEP lawsuit was filed. 96 As such, the plaintiffs argued
that there could not be displacement, seeing as the EPA never actually regulated
GHGs.97 The Court rejected this argument, explaining it was the mere fact of
occupation, not the manner of occupation, that comprises the test for
displacement.98 In other words, if Congress enacted a law pertaining to GHG
regulation, it is inconsequential (for displacement purposes) if the agency charged
with issuing those regulations refuses to do so. 99 Since AEP, lawsuits revolving
around GHGs have struggled to get past displacement. 100

91. Id. § 7407(a).
92. 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
93. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding Massachusetts v. EPA
determined that Congress “had spoken directly to the issue” of greenhouse gas emission by empowering the EPA
to regulate them under the CAA).
94. Id. at 2534–37.
95. Id. at 2537 (“[T]he Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes displace any federal common law
right to seek abatement of carbon-dioxide emissions from fossil-fuel fired power plants.”).
96. Id.
97. Id.
98. See id. (responding to plaintiffs’ argument that the EPA had not displaced the field of regulation
because it had not begun regulating GHGs: “Although EPA has not yet done precisely what plaintiffs demand
here . . . that is not the relevant test . . . The question is whether the field has been occupied, not whether it has
been occupied in a particular manner.”).
99. This, of course, is not to say that the agency would be immune from challenges alleging arbitrary and
capricious agency inaction. See Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No.
115-140) (providing a general measure for invalidating agency action deemed arbitrary and capricious); and see
42 U.S.C.A. § 7607 (Westlaw through Pub.L.No. 115–140) (providing for invalidation of arbitrary and capricious
action in the specific context of the Clean Air Act).
100. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (holding that the public nuisance
action against five of the “largest emitters of carbon dioxide in the United States” was displaced by the Clean Air
Act and the “EPA actions it authorizes”); see also Middlesex Cty. Sewerage Auth. v. Nat’l Sea Clammers Ass’n,
453 U.S. 1, 4 (1981) (finding that a public nuisance claim for the damage caused to fishing grounds by dumping
sewage in the ocean was displaced by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act).
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3. Preemption
The issue of preemption is relevant because of Milwaukee I, which held that
interstate water pollution required “uniform federal standards” and was therefore
a matter for federal law.101 The “implicit corollary” to this conclusion was that the
varying state common law claims over the interstate water pollution were
preempted.102 A few years later, the Supreme Court clarified that this did not apply
to the common law of the pollution’s source state regarding intrastate water
pollution. In other words, plaintiffs could only use state common law to sue water
polluters within their own state, and federal common law would govern if the
polluters were from other states.103
Although Milwaukee’s I–III involved the CWA and interstate water
pollution,104 courts have said that the preemption and displacement analyses would
be identical for the CAA and interstate air pollution.105 Thus, as long as the suit
does not involve air pollution that is interstate, the CAA does not preempt “the
right of any State or political subdivision thereof to adopt or enforce (1) any
standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement
respecting control or abatement of air pollution.” 106 Put differently, the CAA does
not preempt claims at common law under the source state for intrastate pollution. 107
4. Political Question
A fourth challenge facing environmental plaintiffs is the highly political nature
of environmental regulation. 108 Yet even a political case will not pose a
nonjusticiable political question if “the duty asserted can be judicially identified
and its breach judicially determined, and . . . protection for [that right] . . .
judicially molded.” 109 Specifically, nonjusticiable political questions will arise if

101. Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 (1972).
102. Id. at 105 n.6 (seeking to enjoin the City of Milwaukee from discharging sewage into Lake Michigan);
see Tex. Industries, Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981) (“Federal common law and not the
varying common law of the individual States is, we think, entitled and necessary to be recognized as a basis for
dealing in uniform standard with the environmental rights of a State against improper impairment by sources
outside of its domain.”).
103. Int’l Paper Co. v. Ouellette, 479 U.S. 481, 498–99 (1987).
104. Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91, 105 n.6 (1972) (Milwaukee I); City of Milwaukee v. Ill. and
Mich., 451 U.S. 304 (1981) (Milwaukee II); Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 731 F.2d 403 (1984) (Milwaukee III).
105. See Merrick v. Diageo Ams. Supply, Inc., 805 F.3d 685, 695 (6th Cir. 2015) (“What was true for the
Clean Water Act holds true for the Clean Air Act.”).
106. Id. at 688.
107. Id. at 695 (“There is no basis in the Clean Air Act on which to hold that the source state common law
claims of plaintiffs are preempted.”).
108. See Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 131 S. Ct. 2527, 2537 (2011) (saying that plaintiffs’ nuisance
claims were presenting nonjusticiable political questions).
109. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 198 (1962).
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one of the following formulations is “inextricable” 110 from the case:
(1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; (2) a lack of judicially discoverable and
manageable standards for resolving it; (3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial
discretion; (4) the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of the government; (5) an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a
political decision already made; or (6) the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one
question.111
In areas of environmental litigation, courts have said that the third factor—the
“impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion”—is most relevant. 112 For instance, when the Supreme
Court evaluated the plaintiffs’ nuisance claims in AEP, it remarked that
adjudication would require “an initial policy decision in deciding whether there
has been an unreasonable interference with a right common to the general
public.” 113 This, it said, turned on a complicated balancing of interests that was
reserved to a coordinate branch. 114 However, as will be discussed below, 115 use of
common law negligence—for which the legal duty is relative to the reasonableness
of the risk created to the plaintiff116—is less likely to require a policy determination
about what level of GHGs in the atmosphere is reasonable.
B. Industry Comparison
Several commentators have speculated that the looming threat of a climate
breakdown will lead to a rebirth of the creative litigation used throughout the
waves of the tobacco litigation.117 Subsection 1 examines those waves to determine
110. Id. at 217.
111. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277–78 (2004) (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)).
112. See Cal. v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. C06-05755 MJJ, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 68547, at *17 (N.D. Cal.
Sept. 17, 2007) (“Although several of the Baker indicators support the Court’s conclusion that Plaintiff’s current
claims raise non-justiciable political questions, the third indicator is most relevant on the current record.”); see
also Conn. v. Am. Elec. Co. , Inc., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 272 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (focusing on the third Baker factor).
113. Id. at *23 (quoting In re Oswego Barge Corp., 664 F.2d 327, 332 n.5 (2d Cir. 1981) (citations
omitted)).
114. Id. at *24.
115. See infra Part IV.C.1.
116. See Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 248 N.Y. 339, 345 (1928) (“Negligence, like risk, is thus a term
of relation.”).
117. See, e.g., Kurtis Alexander, Suing Big Oil Over Climate Change, Santa Cruz Eyes Wildfire, Storm
Costs, S.F. GATE (Dec. 20, 2017), http://www.sfgate.com/news/article/Suing-Big-Oil-over-climate-changeSanta-Cruz-12445020.php (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The city and county of Santa
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what lessons can translate to a hypothetical climate change plaintiff.118 Subsection
2 then examines another era of litigation involving the infamous DES
medication.119
1. Tobacco
Tobacco litigation in the United States took place in three conceptual waves;
the first two span from approximately 1954 to 1995. 120 Wave One (1954–1962)121
commenced after various publications revealed a link between cigarette smoking
and cancer. However, due to the aggressive defense put up by Big Tobacco,
decades went by without meaningful discovery or adjudication on the merits.122
During this time, about 95 percent of all lawsuits against Big Tobacco were
dropped.123 Substantively, the lawsuits failed to show causation between cigarettes
and lung cancer because a lack of consensus existed over the health effects of
smoking.124 For example, in 1963, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected a
plaintiff widower’s claims of breach of implied warranty and negligence against
defendant tobacco companies. 125 Explaining why the plaintiff failed to establish a
causal connection between the cigarettes and her late husband’s cancer, the court
stated: “[T]he manufacturer had no opportunity to gain knowledge, or to form a
judgment as to the dangerous qualities of the product. The manufacturer was in no
Cruz have joined a growing number of communities suing oil companies over climate change, alleging a plot in
which the fossil fuel industry concealed the dangers of its products from consumers, much like the tobacco
industry did decades ago”); see also Sebastian Malo, Hurricane Harvey’s Aftermath Could See Pioneering
Climate Lawsuits, REUTERS (Sept. 5, 2017, 10:42 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-storm-harveyclimatechange/hurricane-harveys-aftermath-could-see-pioneering-climate-lawsuits-idUSKCN1BG2NI (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (saying that the culmination of the tobacco litigation suits resulted
from the “consensus built around the scientific finding that an increased likelihood of lung cancer could be
attributed to smoking.”).
118. Infra Part IV.B.1.
119. Infra Part IV.B.2.
120. Stephen E. Smith, “Counterblastes” to Tobacco: Five Decades of North American Tobacco
Litigation, 14 WINDSOR REV. LEG. & SOC. ISSUES 1, 6 (2002).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. W.E. Townsley & D.K. Hanks, The Trial Court’s Responsibility to Make Cigarette Disease Litigation
Affordable and Fair, 25 CAL W. L. REV. 275, 277 (1989)
[Tobacco companies] have [forced plaintiffs to drop lawsuits] by taking exceedingly lengthy oral
depositions of plaintiffs and by gathering, through written deposition, every scrap of paper ever
generated about a plaintiff, from cradle to grave. And they have done it by taking endless depositions
of plaintiffs, expert witnesses, and by naming multiple experts of their own for each specialty, such as
pathology, thereby putting plaintiffs’ counsel in the dilemma of taking numerous expensive
depositions or else not knowing what the witness intends to testify to at trial. And they have done it
by taking dozens and dozens of oral depositions, all across the country, of trivial fact witnesses,
particularly in the final days before trial.
Id.
124. Smith, supra note 120, at 8.
125. Lartigue v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 317 F.2d 19, 22 (5th Cir. 1963).
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better position than the consumer.” 126 This argument later became ineffective as
consensus developed around the objective dangers of smoking. 127
Wave Two was ultimately as unsuccessful as Wave One, despite there being a
greater willingness by plaintiffs’ lawyers to spend substantial resources in
litigation during this time.128 Based on Big Tobacco’s argument that smokers
assumed the risk of smoking with full knowledge of its danger, courts found that
the Cigarette Acts, a federal law establishing labeling requirements and warnings
for tobacco products, preempted any claims against manufacturers. 129
By and large, the theories of recovery used in these two waves were rooted in
negligence and were easily rebuffed by Big Tobacco’s hard push to keep the focus
on personal responsibility. 130 However, as plaintiffs invested in building their
respective cases and discovery of industry documents substantiated the claims of
industry misconduct, the assumption of the risk defense became less sustainable.131
Consequently, plaintiffs began winning during Wave Three, earning damages
ranging from $165,000 to $145 billion. 132 This wave included actions brought by
governmental bodies for reimbursement of health care expenditures, 133 individual
and class actions brought for personal injury caused by smoking, and claims
alleging deceptive and unfair business practices by Big Tobacco over their
concerted efforts to suppress information. 134
Stronger organization of the plaintiffs, conclusive evidence of causation, and
knowledge of intentional industry misconduct brought long overdue success in
suing the tobacco companies. 135 Some argue the success was a result of the unified
approach of 46 states all suing Big Tobacco for reimbursement of medical costs,
which resulted in a hefty, yet controversial, settlement.136

126. Id. at 39.
127. See Brendan Nyhan, The Limits of the ‘Tobacco Strategy’ on Climate Change, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 6,
2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/07/upshot/the-limits-of-the-tobacco-strategy-on-climate-change.html
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how the release of “millions of internal
tobacco company documents” helped to undermine the Tobacco industry’s defenses).
128. Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-92, 79 Stat. 282 (1965)
(codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1331–1340 (2000)); Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act of 1969, Pub. L.
No. 91-222, 84 Stat. 87 (1970) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §1131–1140 (2000)).
129. Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990).
130. Smith, supra note 120, at 16.
131. Nyhan, supra note 127.
132. Smith, supra note 120, at 20.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 16.
135. Id. at 21 (“By having access to documents that provide evidence of longstanding fraud and deliberate
misrepresentation, not only is a plaintiff more likely to succeed, but the awarding of punitive damages becomes
a real probability.”).
136. William T. Godshall, Giving 10% to Gain Eternity, 8 TOBACCO CONTROL 437–39 (1999) (criticizing
the reached Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) as being too lenient on the Tobacco companies).
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2. Big Pharma’s DES
Diethylstilbestrol, or “DES,” was a drug given to six million women during
the 1940s and 1970s to prevent miscarriages. 137 In litigating the lawsuits following
an increase in miscarriages caused by the drug, theories of intra-industry joint
liability began to emerge, lowering the causation hurdle for DES plaintiffs who
experienced adverse side effects.138
In Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, for instance, the California Supreme Court
adopted a market share theory of liability for manufacturers of DES,139 even though
clear causation could not be shown for each defendant. 140 Shaping this remedy, the
court relied on fundamental principles of fairness, explaining that:
[A]s between an innocent plaintiff and negligent defendants, the latter
should bear the cost of the injury. Here . . . plaintiff is not at fault in failing
to provide evidence of causation, and although the absence of such
evidence is not attributable to the defendants either, their conduct in
marketing a drug the effects of which are delayed for many years played a
significant role in creating the unavailability of proof. 141
While this philosophy can easily be transposed to climate litigation, the very
fact that market share liability served as the theory of apportionment was
monumental142 because it shifted the burden of proof from innocent plaintiffs to
the defendant pharmaceutical companies. 143
IV. LITIGATION STRATEGY
Based on the information currently available in terms of event attribution, the
apportionment of carbon by individual fossil fuel companies, and the decades-long
conspiracy to prevent meaningful policy change in the United States, successful
litigation on climate change is almost inevitable. 144 The issue, then, becomes
137. Barbara J. Koperski, Market Share Liability for DES (Diethylstilbestrol) Injury: A New High Water
Mark in Tort Law, 60 NEB. L. REV. 432 (1981).
138. Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588 (1980).
139. Id. at 611–12.
140. Id. (holding that it was reasonable in this particular context “to measure the likelihood that any of the
defendants supplied the product which allegedly injured plaintiff by the percentage which the DES sold by each
of them for the purpose of preventing miscarriage bears to the entire production of the drug sold by all for that
purpose”).
141. Id. at 610–11.
142. N. Denise Taylor, California Expands Tort Liability Under the Novel Market Share Theory: Sindell
v. Abbott Laboratories, 8 PEPP. L. REV. 4 (1981), available at https://digitalcommons.pepperdine.edu/plr/vol8/
iss4/4 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
143. Sindell, 26 Cal. 3d at 610–11.
144. See, e.g., Milman, supra note 3 (explaining how the Stanford Research Institute presented a report
about the serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which the president for the Center for International
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“who” is in the best position to sue, and “what” theories of recovery will likely
result in meritorious victories. 145 Section A addresses the “who” and sets forth the
ideal hypothetical parties, 146 and Section B discusses the “what”; the body of law
and remedies most likely to result in making the plaintiffs whole. 147
A. Hypothetical Parties
Party selection cannot be taken lightly, as there are not only jurisdictional
limitations regarding who may sue, but the political motivations behind whomever
brings these climate change lawsuits can severely limit the awards rendered. 148
Thus, Subsection 1 argues that the ideal, hypothetical plaintiff is the private
citizen149 because climate change litigation that is democratized stands a better
chance of success than it would with governmental plaintiffs. Subsection 2
discusses why the Carbon Majors are the proper defendants given their central role
in destabilizing the climate and their ability to pay large damage awards. 150
1. Private Citizens as Plaintiffs
Certain commentators advocate for governmental bodies bringing lawsuits to
address climate-related injury. 151 That prospect is appealing insofar as states may
have a heightened ability to possess Article III standing as opposed to private
citizens,152 and because state litigants generally have greater resources and are
more organized. Nevertheless, climate lawsuits can proceed in state, rather than
federal, courts where Article III standing will not come into play. 153 Furthermore,
private citizens are more likely to obtain adequate damages and deter future
misconduct through the democratization of climate change litigation. 154
Put simply, governmental bodies cannot be trusted to be independent of fossil
fuel influence given the ever-increasing role that legalized bribery has on the
composition and decision-making of the political branches and the long history of

Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil industry worked to actively
undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action even as its own knowledge of
climate risks was growing.”); MIT W. HEMISPHERE PROJECT, supra note 34.
145. See infra Part IV.A-B.
146. See infra Part IV.A.
147. Infra Part IV.B.
148. See infra Part IV.A.1.
149. Infra Part IV.A.
150. Infra Part IV.B.
151. Wood & Galpern, supra note 12.
152. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007) (finding states are “not normal litigants” for purposes of
Article III standing and suggested that they were entitled to “special solicitude”).
153. See infra Part IV.B.1–2.
154. See Part IV.C.
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politicizing climate science. 155 In 2014 alone, the fossil fuel industry spent
$387,945.00 per day lobbying the government.156 Largely due to a series of recent
decisions that weakened campaign finance laws, 157 these contributions are part of
a systematic effort by the fossil fuel industry, via proxy Republicans and
Democrats alike, to limit its regulatory burden. 158 Thus, far from being a partisan
issue, the underlying defect in the U.S. political process has been the invidious
incentive structure whereby industries can give unlimited amounts of money to
politicians who can then turn around and write laws and regulations that benefit
those same industries.159
The fossil fuel and tobacco industries are extraordinarily similar: both were
well-versed in the harms their products posed yet pushed them on the public
anyhow, and both used political engineering and disinformation campaigns to
extract as much wealth as they could before the public became aware of the actual
externalities.160 This is not to disparage the attempts of the several cities, including
New York City, San Francisco, and Oakland, that already have initiated climate
lawsuits.161 But it is important to note that when state and local governments have
banded together to hold a major industry accountable in the past, namely when 47
155. See Milman, supra note 3 (explaining how the Stanford Research Institute presented a report about
the serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which the president for the Center for International
Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil industry worked to actively
undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action even as its own knowledge of
climate risks was growing.”).
156. See JOHN NOËL, CLEAN WATER ACTION/CLEAN WATER F UND, THE CHILLING EFFECT OF OIL & GAS
MONEY ON DEMOCRACY (2016), available at https://www.cleanwateraction.org/sites/default/files/docs/publicat
ions/Money_in_Politics_05%2003%2016a_web%20-%20FINAL.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (“According to the Center for Responsive Politics, the oil and gas sector spent $141,600,720 on
lobbying in 2014, or $387,945.00 a day. It employed over 800 lobbyists, enough to easily cover each member of
Congress.”).
157. See Citizens United v. Fed. Elec. Comm’n, 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010) (finding the First Amendment
prohibited capping corporate spending on political advertising).
158. See NOËL, supra note 156 (explaining that House members taking more than $100,000 by fossil fuels
were nearly twice as likely as members taking less than that to vote against clean air laws, while Senators who
took more than $500,000 were three times more likely.”).
159. See Lee Drutman, How Corporate Lobbyists Conquered American Democracy, THE ATLANTIC (Apr.
20, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/04/how-corporate-lobbyists-conquered-americandemocracy/390822/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (explaining how the beginning of
business lobbying saw immediate success: “[the business lobbying efforts] killed a major labor law reform, rolled
back regulation, lowered their taxes, and helped to move public opinion in favor of less government intervention
in the economy.”); see also NOËL, supra note 156.
160. See Dana Nuccitelli, Is the Fossil Fuel Industry, Like the Tobacco Industry, Guilty of Racketeering?
THE GUARDIAN (Sept. 29, 2015 6:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/climate-consensus-97per-cent/2015/sep/29/is-the-fossil-fuel-industry-like-the-tobacco-industry-guilty-of-racketeering (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting U.S.US District Court Judge Gladys Kessler: “[T]he tobacco
industry’s campaign to ‘maximize industry profits by preserving and expanding the market for cigarettes through
a scheme to deceive the public’ about the health hazards of smoking amounted to a racketeering enterprise.”).
161. Natasha Geiling, Two Major Cities Demand Fossil Fuel Companies Pay for Climate Damages, THINK
PROGRESS (Sept. 20, 2017, 4:55 PM), https://thinkprogress.org/bay-area-sues-oil-companies-c34222138f6a/ (on
file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
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states and Big Tobacco entered into a Master Settlement Agreement (MSA) in
1998, the end result was lackluster at best.162 For one, state officials contracted
with just a few law firms promising them fifteen to twenty percent of any
recovery.163 While making several lawyers multi-millionaires, this tactic diverted
away a huge chunk of the payout. 164 After the attorneys were paid, it was the states’
political, economic, and other budgetary priorities that dictated where the
settlement money went. 165 In other words, relying on state and local governments
to undertake climate change litigation risks inadequate outcomes subject to
bureaucratic and budgetary misuse, similar to the Big Tobacco MSA. 166
As a corollary to the notion that governmental actors cannot be trusted to
litigate these claims effectively, judges may in fact be more sympathetic to private
citizens bringing these lawsuits as opposed to governmental actors. 167 While the
instinct is to blame the industry itself entirely, its donative influence can only
accomplish deregulation to the extent its proxies in government autonomously
decide to do it for them. 168 It is important to note that failure to take the steps
necessary to prevent the climate’s destabilization from becoming irreversible is not
an aberration brought on by the Trump Administration; politicians and bureaucrats
have enabled and subsidized violence to the environment for decades.169 Thus, it
is ostensibly true that the goals of the federal and state governments are disjointed
from those of its constituents, and this means that the private citizens who choose
to stand up for their rights ineffectively protected by their government may have a
greater chance in the eyes of a judge. 170 Further, judges may feel larger damage
awards are justified when the money goes directly to private citizens, and not a
state’s general bank account to allocate as their policy, budgetary, and other
bureaucratic caprices dictate. 171
Therefore, if the goal of climate litigation is to make private citizens whole—
with either a dual or incidental purpose of deterrence—the plaintiffs’ underlying

162. Godshall, supra note 136.
163. Barry Meier, The Spoils of Tobacco Wars; Big Settlement Puts Many Lawyers in the Path of a
Windfall, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 22, 1998), http://www.nytimes.com/1998/12/22/business/spoils-tobacco-wars-bigsettlement-puts-many-lawyers-path-windfall.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (stating
one law firm was guaranteed $1 billion in legal fees from the settlements).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. Godshall, supra note 136.
167. Alexander, supra note 117.
168. See NOËL, supra note 156 (reporting on Big Oil’s lobbying efforts).
169. See Milman, supra note 3 (explaining the Stanford Research Institute presented a report about the
serious consequences of climate change in 1968, which the president for the Center for International
Environmental Law claims “add[ed] to the growing body of evidence that the oil industry worked to actively
undermine public confidence in climate science and in the need for climate action even as its own knowledge of
climate risks was growing.”).
170. Alexander, supra note 117.
171. Meier, supra note 163.
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goals in pursuing the claims and the allocation of damages will be crucial.172
2. Carbon Majors as Defendants
Arguably, there are two distinct categories of defendants deserving of liability
for exacerbating climate change: governmental bodies, including federal, state, and
local governments, and corporations.173 The undeniable appeal of suing state and
local governments lies with the tangible remedies that could result; i.e. the ability
to compel and/or encourage adaptive city planning. 174 Yet those adaptive measures
will in many cases be reactionary: to be sure, 69% of Republicans and four percent
of Democrats believe that the dangers of climate change are overreactions,175
casting doubt over the ability or willingness of governments to make drastic,
proactive changes. In any case, suing local governments—which are much less
suited to satisfy large monetary judgements than the Carbon Majors—cannot
address the particular interest that is the focus of this Comment: protectable, legal
interests of private citizens. 176
Yet the sound critique of this designation bears mentioning: “why are
automakers and power plants sued rather than their customers?” 177 Surely, there is
not “problematic arbitrariness”178 in selecting industry actors as defendants, just as
it was not arbitrary to sue the tobacco companies and the manufacturers of DHS
despite the fact that the victims were in some sense willing participants. Reliable
data can attribute the “lion’s share” of anthropogenic GHG emissions to an
ascertainable number of Carbon Majors,179 and well-established notions of
172. Supra Part IV.A.1 (discussing the indications that governmental actors may not achieve optimal
success in climate change litigation).
173. See Jenna Shweitzer, Climate Change Legal Remedies: Hurricane Sandy and New York City Coastal
Adaptation, 16 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 243, 246266 (2014–2015) (arguing for local suits).
174. See id. at 266 (explaining that local governments are proper defendants for climate-based suits
because they “are responsible for everything from land-use planning and development to infrastructure
management to public health and emergency planning . . . [and are] the appropriate scale of government to address
the issue because experiences of climate-induced weather events will vary at much smaller geographical scales”
(internal citations omitted)).
175. Brenan & Saad, supra note 41.
176. See supra Part I (noting the desire to find solutions to make private citizens whole).
177. Douglas A. Kysar, What Climate Change Can Do About Tort Law, 41 ENVTL. L. 1, 18–19 (2011).
If most courts are unwilling to view handgun manufacturers as proximate contributors to the public
nuisance of violent crime, how many will see the oil industry and other corporate defendants as chiefly
responsible for activities that, in truth, are imbricated throughout modern society and that only cause
harmful impacts when combined with all other such activities and when traced forward through an
extraordinarily complex series of ripple effects that span the planet?
Id.
178. Id. at 18 (“[T]here is a problematic arbitrariness in plaintiffs’ designation of the defendant class.”).
179. See Suzanne Goldenberg, Just 90 Companies Caused Two-Thirds of Man-Made Global Warming
Emissions, THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 20, 2013 11:07 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2013/nov/20/
90-companies-man-made-global-warming-emissions-climate-change (on file with The University of the Pacific
Law Review) (quoting climate researcher Richard Heede: “There are thousands of oil, gas and coal producers in
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substantial causality can justify even joint and several liability for the indivisible
harm experienced by climate change plaintiffs. 180 Furthermore, as discussed more
in Section C,181 the enormous disparity between the respective carbon footprints
of oil companies and consumers render this argument unavailing.
B. Body of Law, Venue, and Remedy
It appears that for private plaintiffs, relying on statutory law to obtain damages
leads to a dead end. 182 Not only are there the jurisdictional barriers such as
standing, but the political question doctrine and the displacement of federal
common law have also come into play, causing many to lose hope for the
possibility of climate change litigation. 183 Subsection 1 posits that plaintiffs
seeking damages for harm caused by exacerbated natural disasters should utilize
state common law as their theory of recovery and avoid statutory violations
altogether.184 Next, Subsection 2 discusses how plaintiffs can avoid the political
question problem by choosing remedies that are compensatory in nature and
choosing defendants that have engaged in intentional misconduct.185
1. Common Law and Displacement
Theoretically, one could bypass obscure justiciability problems by sticking
with a well-established principle of state common law. 186 But succeeding on such
a claim—or at least getting to the merits of the case—would require that a judge
find the state common law claims neither displaced by the federal common law,
nor preempted by the federal statutes relating to the same subject. 187 When it comes
to climate change torts, however, state common law should not be displaced unless
there is de facto occupation; unless there is actual agency action that can rationally

the world . . . But the decision makers, the CEOs, or the ministers of coal and oil if you narrow it down to just
one person, they could all fit on a Greyhound bus or two.”); see also HEEDE, supra note 8 (attributing GHG output
to individual fossil fuel companies).
180. See infra Part IV.C.1 (discussing the imposition of joint and several liability).
181. See infra Part IV.C (arguing that individuals are not contributorily negligent in a res ipsa loquiturstyle analysis).
182. See supra Part III.A (discussing the problems of preemption and displacement).
183. See, e.g., Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012); see also
Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011); Shweitzer, supra note 173 at 264 (arguing AEP
“basically closed the door on climate change torts”).
184. Grossman, supra note 12, at 59 (“Tort-based climate change litigation strikes many people as a radical
idea at first. Basic tort principles . . . combined with the overwhelming scientific consensus that global warming
is occurring and the evidence that it is having present detrimental effects, may provide a basis for claims of some
liability against fossil fuel companies . . . for some of climate change’s effects.”).
185. Infra Part IV.B.II.
186. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007).
187. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 429 (2011).
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be expected to mitigate the threat of climate change. 188
Massachusetts v. EPA said that GHGs were regulated under the CAA, 189 and
the Supreme Court has confirmed that the EPA is therefore the proper entity to
combat the threat of climate change. 190 All else being equal, this can be yielded to
shut down all such claims having to do with GHGs and air quality. 191 And, in AEP,
the Court stated it was the fact, not the manner, of occupation of a particular field
that comprised the test for displacement. 192 What, then, comes of the fact that all
mention of GHGs has been scrubbed from the EPA’s website, and that the current
Administration has already engaged in historic deregulation of environmental
regulation?193
To wrap one’s head around that notion, here is a thought experiment: If
Congress repealed the Clean Air Act, then it would be undeniable that causes of
action relating to GHGs would no longer be displaced or preempted by federal
law.194 But would a similar result obtain from largely executive inaction,195 absent
specific statutory repeal that has gone through the legislative process? The answer
is probably not, based on the fact that in AEP, the Court squarely rejected the
argument that since the EPA had not started regulating GHGs it should not displace
GHG-related causes of action. 196 This would seem to confirm that even if the
executive branch utterly failed to execute a law passed by Congress, that law can
still be used to justify displacing state actions on the same subject. 197
The logic behind this test for displacement is clear in light of the channels
already in place allowing for lawsuits against agencies if, for instance, one had the
statutory directive to regulate GHGs yet refused to do so arbitrarily and
capriciously. 198 Here is another thought experiment: If the United States elected a

188. See infra Part IV.B.1.
189. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
190. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 428.
191. See Shweitzer, supra note 173 at 264 (saying that AEP “basically closed the door on climate change
torts”).
192. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011).
193. Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6; Madison Park, EPA Removes Climate Change References
from Website, Report Says, CNN (Dec. 8, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/12/08/politics/epa-climate-changereferences/index.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
194. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. 426 (noting that the test for displacement is congressional
occupation of the field).
195. See, e.g., Road to Repeal Document, supra note 6 (explaining executive plans to dismantle current
regulations).
196. Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 426.
197. Id.
198. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C.A. § 706 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) § 7607; see
Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 564 U.S. at 426 (“[W]ere EPA to decline to regulate carbon-dioxide emissions
altogether at the conclusion of its ongoing § 7411 rulemaking, the federal courts would have no warrant to employ
the federal common law of nuisance to upset the agency’s expert determination. EPA’s judgment, we hasten to
add, would not escape judicial review.”).

673

2019 / Litigation for the Era of Extreme Weather
president who thinks climate change is a Chinese hoax199 and whose administration
has indicated that it would be willing to disobey federal court orders, 200 such a
scenario may render efforts to use district courts to compel unlawfully withheld
agency action ineffective. That a new chief executive could replace the current one
rather quickly201 does not take away from the potential that rogue administrations
opposed to climate action will continue to occupy the White House. To be sure,
the current U.S. landscape is itself in relatively depressed conditions: 60% of the
entire country is unable to afford a $1,000 emergency,202 and movement up the
economic ladder is unattainable for many given the high cost of education. 203
Therefore, it is prudent to treat a rogue administration as the product of the systems
and policies already in place, rather than an isolated incident attributable to more
comforting excuses, like Russian interference or Jill Stein. 204 Furthermore, even a
rogue administration that is in fact an anomaly and does lead to a rebirth of
progressive liberalism in the U.S. (or, to be fair, at the least moderate-toconservative neo-liberalism) 205 can still leave a long-lasting and even permanent
199. See Peter Baker, Does Donald Trump Still Think Climate Change Is a Hoax? No One Can Say, N.Y.
TIMES (June 2, 2017), https://nyti.ms/2rAPzsh (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (noting the
White House has refused to answer whether President Trump still retains such views, although he has tweeted,
“The concept of global warming was created by and for the Chinese in order to make U.S. manufacturing noncompetitive” and that “global warming is a total, and very expensive, hoax!”).
200. Dahlia Lithwick, Leon Neyfakh & Mark Joseph Stern, What Happens If Donald Trump Refuses a
Federal Court Order, S LATE (Jan. 30, 2017, 9:28 PM), http://www.slate.com/news-and-politics/ 2017/01/whathappens-if-donald-trump-refuses-a-federal-court-order.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (reporting that Customs and Border Protection were disregarding federal court orders, and enforcing
Trump’s travel ban leading to the question with “little or no precedent in American history: What happens when
the federal government or its agents refuse to honor a court order handed down by a federal judge?”).
201. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (“The [president] . . . shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years”).
202. See Eleanor Goldberg, Most Americans Can’t Afford a Minor Emergency, HUFFINGTON POST (Jan.
29, 2018, 5:46 AM), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/most-americans-cant-afford-to-pay-for-even-aminor-emergency_us_5a68e67ae4b0022830090e5b (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review)
(noting how only “39 percent of Americans have enough money in savings to cover an unexpected $1,000 bill”).
203. See Robert Haveman & Timothy Smeeding, The Role of Higher Education in Social Mobility, 16
F UTURE OF CHILDREN 125–50 (Fall 2006) (“The high concentration in the nation’s colleges and universities of
youth from the top echelons of parental income and social class is disturbing and appears to be increasing.”).
204. See, e.g., Simon van Zuylen-Wood, Does This Man Know More Than Robert Mueller? Glenn
Greenwald’s War on the Russia Investigation, N.Y. MAG. (Jan. 21, 2018, 9:06 AM),)
http://nymag.com/daily/intelligencer/2018/01/glenn-greenwald-russia-investigation.html (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (“[T]he Russia-Trump story is a shiny red herring—one that distracts from
the failures, corruption, and malice of the very Establishment so invested in promoting it.”); Jessie Van Amburg,
Rachel Maddow Calls Out Third-Party Voters, TIME (Nov. 9, 2016), http://time.com/4564294/rachel-maddowthird-party-candidates-election-2016/ (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Rachel
Maddow of MNSBC on the 2016 election: “If you vote for somebody who can’t win for president, it means that
you don’t care who wins for president.”); Eli Watkins, How Gary Johnson and Jill Stein Helped Elect Donald
Trump,
CNN
(Nov.
25,
2016),
https://www.cnn.com/2016/11/10/politics/gary-johnson-jill-steinspoiler/index.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
205. The Obama Administration did begin taking steps toward regulating GHGs in “a set of muchanticipated—and first ever—steps to regulate oil and gas industry emissions of methane, a powerful greenhouse
gas second only to carbon dioxide in its role in the climate debate.” See Chris Mooney & Brady Dennis, Obama
Administration Announces Historic New Regulations for Methane Emissions from Oil and Gas, WASH. POST
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mark—especially when it comes to the environment. In a single term, the Trump
Administration has achieved historic deregulation of corporate polluters,
appointed two justices to the Supreme Court, and broke a record on most appellate
judges confirmed of any president in their first year in office. 206
Thus, when it comes to the impending existential crisis of global climate
change, the distinction between fact and manner of occupation is illusory, and
courts should require only de facto occupation by the coordinate political branch
before finding that Congress has spoken.207 In other words, issues involving “the
biggest threat to humanity”208 cannot be precluded from resolution by judges that
are “particularly loath” to break from traditional norms. 209
States, of course, are not all on board with deregulation. Former California
Governor Jerry Brown, for example, planned to heighten motor vehicle emissions
standards, and other states have similarly worked to decrease their respective CO 2
emissions and maintain compliance with the Paris Climate Accord’s voluntary
standards.210 Thus, any possible argument based on the EPA’s retreat from
regulatory occupation of GHGs would fail in states where there continues to be
strong regulation on the topic. 211
The interstate and intrastate air pollution distinction—as per Milwaukee’s
analysis pertaining to water pollution—should also be recognized as illusory in the
climate change context, and plaintiffs suing for interstate air pollution should not
be limited to federal common law (subject to displacement) in the first place.212
The concern in Milwaukee I was that even though states enacting more
stringent standards than those of the federal CWA would generally further the
purpose of environmental legislation, the risks inherent with inconsistent standards
across state lines and the burden to industry compelled a finding that federal law
(May 12, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energyenvironment/wp/2016/05/12/obama-administrati
on-announces-historic-new-regulations-for-methane-emissions-from-oil-and-gas/?utm_term=.65c26c1d792a
(on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
206. Tessa Berenson, President Trump Appointed Four Times as Many Federal Appeals Judges as Obama
in His First Year, TIME (Dec. 15, 2017), http://time.com/5066679/donald-trump-federal-judges-record/ (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (citing a report by Axois: “Trump has successfully appointed 12
so far; President Barack Obama confirmed just three in his first year, and President George W. Bush confirmed
six. He beat out presidents Richard Nixon and John F. Kennedy, who each confirmed 11.”).
207. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 426 (2011).
208. Brian Kahn, Climate Change Is the World’s Biggest Risk, in 3 Charts, CLIMATE CENTRAL (Jan. 12,
2017), http://www.climatecentral.org/news/climate-change-worlds-biggest-risk-charts-21050 (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review).
209. See John T. Loughran, Some Reflections on the Role of Judicial Precedent, 22 FORDHAM L. REV. 1,
8 (1953) (“The common law has been able to maintain its preeminent place over the centuries because of its
stability and its inherent capacity for keeping pace with the demands of an ever-changing and ever-growing
civilization.”).
210. Evan Halper, A California-Led Alliance of Cities and States Vows to Keep the Paris Climate Accord
Intact, L.A. TIMES (June 2, 2017, 4:15 PM), http://www.latimes.com/politics/la-na-pol-paris-states-20170602story.html (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
211. Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc., 564 U.S. at 426.
212. Ill. v. City of Milwaukee, 406 U.S. 91 (1972).
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was to control. 213 This touches on the “interstate character” of the nature of the
harm that the Carbon Majors have had on our hypothetical plaintiffs; that is, these
fossil fuel companies are multi-national with operations all over the world, and
their contribution to plaintiffs’ current harm is the culmination of decades of
carbon emissions spread out across the planet. 214 Yet, the fact that there is no
express congressional displacement of state law (language in the CAA even
provides specifically for maintenance of common law suits),215 means that the
justification for preventing adjudication at the state level lies squarely with the
concern that inconsistent standards will burden the industry. Not only does this
justification make it harder to hold oil companies liable for their wrongdoing, 216 it
also disregards the fact that severe weather will damage different geographic areas,
at different times, and to different extents, making the state-by-state adjudicatory
process preferable for experimenting with theories of recovery.
2. Compensatory Damages
In addition to the use of common law, seeking remedies that are compensatory
in nature and necessary to make plaintiffs whole can mitigate issues of
nonjusticiable political questions. 217 It may even be feasible to assume the CAA
does not preempt claims of a non-regulatory nature brought by plaintiffs under the
common law of at least the pollution’s source state.218
While it is true that a government agency’s determination of how best to
implement a statute is indeed political,219 a private cause of action against Carbon

213. Id. at n.6.
214. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 422 (“[C]onsiderations of scale and complexity distinguish
global warming from the more bounded pollution giving rise to past federal nuisance suits.”); Transcript of Oral
Argument at 57–58, Am. Elec. Power Co., Inc. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410 (2011) (No. 10-174), available at
https://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/argument_transcripts/2010/10-174.pdf (on file with The
University of the Pacific Law Review) (quoting Chief Justice Roberts, who argues that because “everyone is
harmed by global warming,” letting the case continue would mean that “every individual in the world” could sue).
215. See CAA, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7416 (Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 115-140) (“Except as otherwise
provided . . . nothing in this chapter shall preclude or deny the right of any State or political subdivision thereof
to adopt or enforce (1) any standard or limitation respecting emissions of air pollutants or (2) any requirement
respecting control or abatement of air pollution.”).
216. See Am. Elec. Power Co., 564 U.S. at 424 (holding that plaintiffs could not pursue their claims against
the defendants).
217. See Gordon v. Tex., 153 F.3d 190, 195 (5th Cir. 1998) (“Monetary damages . . . do not . . . constitute
a form of relief that is not judicially manageable.”).
218. Freeman v. Grain Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 80 (Iowa 2014).
219. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962).) The Political Question Doctrine is
essentially a function of the separation of powers. Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve
a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to a
coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for
resolving it; or the impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly
for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent resolution without
expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need for
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Majors is not. A private cause of action would not be based on whether a federal
agency should or should not have put a certain statute in place.220 Suing Carbon
Majors is based on the affirmative misconduct by billionaire, multi-national
corporations that has caused and will continue to cause billions and eventually
trillions of dollars in property damage alone. 221 The harm that must be redressed
does not arise from any difference in political opinion or expertise-based
discretion, and the common law already provides adequate theories that a plaintiff
can pursue.222 Furthermore, the damages sought by these claims will not be
abatement;223 in other words, the redress awarded to successful plaintiffs will not
be a mandate for Big Oil to reduce its contribution to global warming. Instead,
redress would take the form of compensatory damages for the invasion of an
individual right (e.g. the right to life, liberty, and pursuit of happiness, 224 and the
right to use and enjoy one’s property). Therefore, staying closely connected to the
common law of tort, which courts have said “provides clear and well-settled rules
on which the district court can easily rely,”225 will obviate any unwarranted judicial
lawmaking.
As for the issue of preemption, several of the failed climate change cases
asserted causes of action for failing to regulate; suggesting—or at least leaving
open the possibility of—justiciability where the relief sought is tethered to nonstatutory interests. 226 Courts have also recently held that the “purpose and function
of the [CAA] differs sufficiently from the purpose and function of ‘a private
lawsuit seeking damages anchored in ownership of real property’. . . [t]he purpose
of state nuisance and common law actions is to protect the use and enjoyment of
specific property, not to achieve a general regulatory purpose.” 227 As stated in
unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality of embarrassment
from multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question.
Id.
220. Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 537533 (2007).
221. The Hidden Costs of Fossil Fuels, UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, https://www.ucsusa.org/cleanenergy/coal-and-other-fossil-fuels/hidden-cost-of-fossils#.WlKd_1Q-eAw (last updated Aug. 30, 2016) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
222. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 208 (1962) (“The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in
the right of every individual to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury.”).
223. See Native Vill. of Kivalina v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 857853 (9th Cir. 2012) (seeking
abatement of CO2 emissions by coal plants); Am. Elec. Power Co. v. Conn., 564 U.S. 410, 411 (2011) (“The
Court need not address the question whether, absent the Clean Air Act and the EPA actions it authorizes, the
plaintiffs could state a federal common-law claim for curtailment of greenhouse gas emissions because of their
contribution to global warming. Any such claim would be displaced by the federal legislation authorizing EPA to
regulate carbon-dioxide emissions.”).
224. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
225. McMahon v. Presidential Airways, Inc., 502 F.3d 1331, 1364 (11th Cir. 2007); Alperin v. Vatican
Bank, 410 F.3d 532, 554 (9th Cir. 2005).
226. See Mass. v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007) (suing for failure to regulate GHGs); Native Vill. of Kivalina
v. ExxonMobil Corp., 696 F.3d 849, 853 (9th Cir. 2012) (attempting to sue the major polluting corporations that
caused environmental harm to the city).
227. Brown–Forman Corp. v. Miller, 528 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Ky. 2017) (quoting Freeman v. Grain
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Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., “States may be preempted from setting their own
emissions standards, but they are not preempted from compensating injured
citizens.” 228 And in Brown-Forman Corp. v. Miller:
The [CAA] does not provide a mechanism for awarding monetary
compensation to an injured party suffering from a particularized harm.
“Thus, a property owner seeking full compensation for harm related to the
use and enjoyment of property at a specific location must resort to
common law or state law theories to obtain a full recovery.” 229
Thus, where the cause of action involves affirmative misconduct and is filed
by a private citizen against a corporation for compensatory damages caused by an
exacerbated natural disaster, the suit will not go beyond the province of the court
into political matters, and as a claim for the invasion of a personal right it, “by
definition,” will “not involve a political question.” 230
C. Causes of Action and Remedy
Several common law theories of recovery are well-suited for the kind of claim
a plaintiff experiencing property damage from climate change could pursue. 231
This part analyzes the more obvious ones that can apply to the Carbon Majors:
negligence232 and nuisance.233
1. Common Law Negligence and Res Ipsa Loquitur
A prima facie case for negligence requires a showing of: (1) a duty owed to
the plaintiff by the defendant; (2) breach of that duty; (3) causation between the
breach and plaintiff’s harm; and (4) damages.234 For plaintiffs who suffer property
damage as a result of exacerbated natural disasters, the damages prong will pose
little challenge.235 However, the elements of duty, breach, and causation will
Processing Corp., 848 N.W.2d 58, 84 (Iowa 2014)).
228. Bennett v. Mallinckrodt, Inc., 698 S.W.2d 854, 862 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985).
229. Brown–Forman Corp. v. Miller, 528 S.W.3d 886, 894 (Ky. 2017).
230. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION §2.6, 149 n.7 (5th ed. 2007) (quoting HOWARD FINK
& MARK TUSHNET, FEDERAL J URISDICTION: POLICY AND PRACTICE 231 (2d ed. 1987) (“[N]otice the effect of
Marbury’s classification: Standing is just the obverse of political questions. If a litigant claims that an individual
right has been invaded, the lawsuit by definition does not involve a political question.”)).
231. Grossman, supra note 12, at 59.
232. Infra Part V.A.1
233. Infra Part V.A.2.
234. Hon. Theodore R. Boehm, A Tangled Webb-Reexamining the Role of Duty in Indiana Negligence
Actions, 37 IND. L. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
235. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1979) (explaining that the word “harm” implies “a loss
or detriment to a person . . . in so far as physical changes have a detrimental effect on a person, that person suffers
harm.”).
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require more effort to prove. 236
Establishing duty requires a showing that the type of harm suffered by the
plaintiff was a foreseeable consequence of the defendant’s conduct, such that the
defendant’s actions created an unreasonable risk of harm to that foreseeable
plaintiff.237 In general, breaching a duty will only occur when an actor’s conduct
is unreasonable under the circumstances, creating a foreseeable risk of harm that
eventually materialized. 238
Thus, under a negligence theory, a hypothetical climate plaintiff would allege
that the Carbon Majors owed her a duty to not create an unreasonable risk of
property damage. 239 In other words, this plaintiff will establish that the Carbon
Majors risked causing her property damage by emitting high amounts of CO2 into
the atmosphere, and that the risk was unreasonable given the circumstances. 240 Of
course, this raises the problem inherent in a tort based on climate change;
somewhat paradoxically, the larger the scope of potential plaintiffs, the less likely
it is that liability will attach. 241 This is the relational aspect of legal duties because
a defendant cannot be held liable for negligence solely by acting negligently. 242
That “climate” is itself global in nature (defined as “the weather conditions
prevailing in an area in general or over a long period”) seems to inevitably lead to
the conclusion that affecting the climate would create global risk.243 But in reality,
there is no reason why the relational aspect of a legal duty cannot be global when
the risk itself is.244 In fact, numerous commentators have observed that this
“omnipresent plaintiff” problem is indeed not a problem when it comes to climate
change and the problems that climate change will cause.245
As for breach, there are several broad approaches to deciding whether one has
occurred.246 Learned Hand’s classic BPL formulation provides that a breach occurs
if the burden of preventing the harm was less than the magnitude of the potential
236. Infra Part V.A.1.
237. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928).
238. Id.
239. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 7 (1979).
240. Brown v. Kendall, 60 Mass. 292 (1850) (applying the reasonable person standard as the objective
level of care to be used in order to avoid liability for negligence).
241. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 99 (N.Y. 1928) (“The conduct of the defendant’s guard, if a wrong in its relation
to the holder of the package, was not a wrong in its relation to the plaintiff, standing far away. Relatively to her
it was not negligence at all.”).
242. Id. at 101 (“Negligence, like risk, is thus a term of relation.”).
243. Bhavya Reddy, Climate Change Is a Global Problem. Climate Action Is a Local Solution, THE
GUARDIAN (Oct. 5, 2015, 07:15 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/oct/05/climate-changeglobal-problem-climate-action-local-solution (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
244. Palsgraf, 162 N.E. at 101.
245. See Grossman, supra note 12, at 40 (arguing that the Supreme Court’s latest decisions have enhanced
the plaintiff’s ability in a climate tort case to establish standing); Hunter & Salzman, supra note 12, at 1757 (“The
identifiable risks of climate change are becoming better understood, and most of them have become more likely
with greater consequences than was thought even a decade ago.”).
246. Hunter & Salzman, supra note 12, at 1757.

679

2019 / Litigation for the Era of Extreme Weather
harm times its likelihood of occurring. 247 This approach brings in various policy
issues surrounding the acceptable burden to place on energy producers, but any
such burden must necessarily be juxtaposed with Carbon Majors’ annual net
revenue and the amount it receives in subsidies. 248 The United States itself spends
approximately $20.5 billion annually on “fossil fuel exploration and production
subsidies,” 249 which does not include military costs to defend fossil fuel interests
globally250 or the costs incurred as a result of pollution. 251 All of this is not to argue
for ending these subsidies—especially because doing so would only decrease total
CO2 emissions by a small percentage.252 Rather, the point is to emphasize that the
fossil fuel companies are in the best position to uphold the burden of losses when
it comes to environmental harm—a notion that reflects supposedly one of the
fundamental functions of tort law. 253
The most significant counterargument in finding a breach under any method
will be the social utility provided by the Carbon Majors.254 However, even granting
the enormously high value of the Carbon Majors providing energy, that utility
relates only to short-term goals (which Big Oil could achieve by alternate, less
harmful means), and emitting gigaton after gigaton of CO 2 into the atmosphere
unequivocally has negative utility in the long run. 255
247. Id.; United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169, 173 (2d Cir. 1947) (“[T]he owner’s duty, as
in other similar situations, to provide against resulting injuries is a function of three variables: (1) The probability
that she will break away; (2) the gravity of the resulting injury, if she does; (3) the burden of adequate
precautions.”).
248. Carrington, supra note 4 (explaining that internationally, governments spend an estimated $10 million
a minute on fossil fuels).
249. Fossil Fuel Subsidies: Overview, How Much Money Does the United States Government Provide to
Support the Oil, Gas, and Coal Industries, OIL CHANGE INT’L, http://priceofoil.org/fossil-fuel-subsidies/ (last
visited Jan. 3, 2018) (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
250. Id.
251. See DAVID COADY, IAN PARRY, LOUIS SEARS & BAOPING SHANG, INT’L MONETARY F UND, IMF
WORKING P APER: HOW LARGE ARE GLOBAL ENERGY S UBSIDIES? 4 (May 2015), available at
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/wp/2015/wp15105.pdf (on file with The University of the Pacific Law
Review) (calling for drastic subsidy reform reflecting an “increasing recognition of the perverse environmental,
fiscal, macroeconomic, and social consequences of energy subsidies.”); Id. at 6 (“Most energy subsidies arise
from the failure to adequately charge for the cost of domestic environmental damage—only about one-quarter of
the total is from climate change.”).
252. Eduardo Porter, Do Oil Companies Really Need $4 Billion Per Year of Taxpayers’ Money?, N.Y.
TIMES (Aug. 5, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/06/upshot/do-oil-companies-really-need-4-billion-peryear-of-taxpayers-money.html?_r=0 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (referring to a report
by the Council on Foreign Relations: “Cutting oil drilling subsidies might reduce domestic oil production by 5
percent in the year 2030.”).
253. Wex: Tort, CORNELL L. SCH., https://www.law.cornell.edu/wex/tort (last visited Jan. 2, 2018) (on file
with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
254. RICHARD S.J. TOL, UNIV. OF S USSEX, THE PRIVATE BENEFIT OF CARBON AND ITS SOCIAL COST
(2017), available at https://www.sussex.ac.uk/webteam/gateway/file.php?name=wps-07-2017.pdf&site=24&ut
m_content=buffera74f6&utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter.com&utm_campaign=buffer (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The private benefit of carbon is much higher than the social cost of
carbon.”).
255. UNION OF CONCERNED SCIENTISTS, supra note 221.
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As for causation, every natural disaster that is uncommon to an area should
entail a res ipsa loquitur-style analysis, a doctrine developed at common law that
shifts the initial burden of producing evidence of causation to the defendant based
on the rationale that such evidence is “practically accessible to him but inaccessible
to the injured person.” 256 For the doctrine to apply: (1) the kind of injury that
occurred must be one that “ordinarily does not occur [absent] someone’s
negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the
exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any
voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” 257
It was probably negligence that proximately caused property damage that
would not have occurred were the climate not destabilized.258 The top 90 carbon
producers in the world probably contributed substantially to that destabilization. 259
Moreover, although it is true that every person—particularly Americans—
contributes to climate change, even the relatively high consumption of fossil fuels
by the average American is not a substantial enough amount of CO 2 that could
disrupt natural atmospheric levels the way that gigatons over decades can. 260
As such, Carbon Majors should be jointly and severally liable to any person
whose property has been destroyed from such an abnormally intense weather
event.261 It will then be left to the industry itself to determine its respective liability

256. See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal. 2d 486, 489; Anderson v. Serv. Merch. Co., Inc., 485 N.W.2d 170,
176 (Neb. 1992) (explaining when res ipsa loquitur applies, “an inference of negligence exists for submission to
the fact finders, which may accept or reject the inference in the factual determination whether the defendant is
negligent.”).
257. Ybarra, 25 Cal.2d at 489.
258. See, e.g., Jin-Ho Yoon et al., Explaining Extreme Events of 2014, 96 BULL. AM. METEOROLOGICAL
SOC’Y 96 S5–S9 (2015) (“The fire season in northern California during 2014 was the second largest in terms of
burned areas since 1996. An increase in fire risk in California is attributable to human-induced climate change.”);
Neal Conan, Study Links Extreme Weather and Climate Change, NPR (Feb. 17, 2011, 2:35 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2011/02/17/133843546/Study-Links-Extreme-Weather-And-Climate-Change (on file with
The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“In October and November of 2000, England and Wales experienced
the wettest autumn since they started to keep records back in 1766.”); But see Cheng et al., How Has HumanInduced Climate Change Affected California Drought Risk? (Jan. 1, 2016), https://journals.ametsoc.org/doi/pdf
/10.1175/JCLI-D-15-0260.1 (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review) (“The results thus indicate
that the net effect of climate change has made agricultural drought less likely and that the current severe impacts
of drought on California’s agriculture have not been substantially caused by long-term climate changes.”).
259. See Drollette Jr., supra note 3 (explaining how just 90 entities are responsible for 63% of all industrial
CO2 and methane emissions).
260. See Mapping the American carbon footprint, down to the last zip code (interactive maps),
SRHINKTHATFOOTPRINT.COM (last visited Apr. 1, 2018), http://shrinkthatfootprint.com/american-carbonfootprint (on file with The University of the Pacific Law Review).
261. See Rourk v. Selvey, 164 S.E.2d 909, 910 (S.C. 1968) (quoting Pendleton v. Columbia Ry., Gas &
Elec. Co., 131 S.E. 265, 267 (S.C. 1926)).
That a single injury, which is the proximate result of the separate and independent acts of negligence
of two or more parties, subjects the tort-feasors, even [absent concerted action], to a liability which is
both joint and several, is a proposition recognized and approved in this state and supported by the great
weight of authority elsewhere. Since the liability of such tort-feasors is both joint and several, it is
well settled that the law gives to the injured party the option of suing two or more of the parties liable
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in order to seek contribution in a given case. 262 Because of the global nature of
climate change, this determination will not always mirror the actor’s actual
contribution. Thus, the sector should internally set automatic standards for
apportioning damages in any given case according to the proportion of each
companies’ respective GHG emissions. 263 By imposing joint and several liability,
a plaintiff can choose to collect damages from a larger pool of defendants, tailoring
the choice to the particular jurisdiction and/or legal theory, thereby increasing the
likelihood of a court exercising jurisdiction. 264
The court could also apportion these damages itself and impose market share
liability as opposed to joint and several.265 However, the companies are better
suited to make this determination within the industry; not only does the data
necessary for attribution analyses come from the individual companies’ own selfreporting,266 but these companies also tend to employ or at least have access to
numerous highly-skilled experts who can perform in-depth attribution analyses.267
It would also act to “smoke out”268 those defendants whose self-reported figures
are inaccurate, for example, since the potentially enormous sums at stake would
incentivize intra-industry investigation and other methods of ascertaining just
apportionment.
For areas that typically experience extreme weather, but nonetheless
experience degrees of severity that differ from typical weather patterns had
defendants not been negligent, 269 damages can be limited. One way to limit
jointly; that is, as defendants in one action, or of suing each upon his several liability in a separate
action.
Id.
262. Id. (discussing the theory of apportionment).
263. See HEEDE, supra note 8, at 13 (identifying specific GHG outputs by individual companies).
264. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT OF LIABILITY § 10 (AM. LAW INST. 2000)
(“When, under applicable law, some persons are jointly and severally liable to an injured person, the injured
person may sue for and recover the full amount of recoverable damages from any jointly and severally liable
person.”).
265. See Sindell v. Abbott Labs., 26 Cal. 3d 588, 611–12 (1980) (imposing market-share liability on
manufacturers of DES).
266. See HEEDE, supra note 8, at 13 (noting how their attribution analyses sought “reliable and publicly
available production data, preferably self-reported by the [Carbon] producers.”).
267. See Nuccitelli, supra note 160 (noting how Exxon was at the “cutting edge of climate science
research” and was informed by its own scientists that “[t]he consensus is that a doubling of atmospheric CO2 from
its pre-industrial revolution value would result in an average global temperature rise of (3.0 ± 1.5)°C . . . There is
unanimous agreement in the scientific community that a temperature increase of this magnitude would bring about
significant changes in the earth’s climate, including rainfall distribution and alterations in the biosphere.”).
268. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN & CATHERINE M. SHARKEY, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS (11th ed.)
(discussing the “smoke-out” function of res ipsa loquitur).
269. See, e.g., Yoon et al., supra note 258, at S5 (“The fire season in northern California during 2014 was
the second largest in terms of burned areas since 1996. An increase in fire risk in California is attributable to
human-induced climate change.”); Conan, supra note 258 (“In October and November of 2000, England and
Wales experienced the wettest autumn since they started to keep records back in 1766.”); but see Cheng et al.,
supra note 258 (“The results thus indicate that the net effect of climate change has made agricultural drought less
likely and that the current severe impacts of drought on California’s agriculture have not been substantially caused
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damages is to ascertain the percentage by which the weather event was exacerbated
by climate change in general, using that percentage to find the probable extent of
damage that would have occurred had there been no negligence, and reducing the
defendant’s liability by the difference in like damage costs.270
2. Nuisance
In general, there are two types of nuisance; a private nuisance is “an activity
that substantially and unreasonably interferes with the use and enjoyment of
land,”271 whereas a public nuisance is “an unreasonable interference with a right
common to the general public.” 272
At first glance, the theory of nuisance sounds advantageous to the potential
plaintiff, considering the focus on the reasonability of the interference. 273
However, that aspect of the claim proved problematic for the plaintiffs in
Connecticut v. American Electric Power, who had claimed that about “ten percent
of all anthropogenic carbon dioxide emissions in the United States” was caused by
the specific defendant utilities. 274 This case was dismissed for posing a
nonjusticiable political question275 since adjudicating the nuisance claim would
require a judicial determination of how much CO 2 constitutes an “unreasonable
interference.”
As such, it appears that alleging nuisance is both unworkable in the sense that
it requires an outright judicial determination of reasonableness, 276 but it is also
unnecessary given the fact that negligence could easily achieve the same result.
And, even though negligence also involves assessment of reasonableness, the
reasonableness in the negligence context is relative to the level of risk created by

by long-term climate changes.”).
270. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: APPORTIONMENT LIABILITY § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2000).
When damages for an injury can be divided by causation, the factfinder first divides them into their
indivisible component parts and separately apportions liability for each indivisible component part . . .
Damages can be divided by causation when the evidence provides a reasonable basis for the factfinder
to determine: (1) that any legally culpable conduct of a party or other relevant person to whom the
factfinder assigns a percentage of responsibility was a legal cause of less than the entire damages for
which the plaintiff seeks recovery and (2) the amount of damages separately caused by that conduct.
Id; see also id. § A19 (“If one defendant and at least one other party . . . may be found . . . to have engaged in
tortious conduct that was a legal cause of an indivisible injury, each such party and settling tortfeasor is submitted
to the factfinder for assignment of a percentage of comparative responsibility.”).
271. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821d (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
272. Id. § 821B (1).
273. Id. § 821 (defining private nuisance as an “unreasonable interference” with land and a public nuisance
as an “unreasonable interference with a right common to the general public”).
274. Complaint at 26, Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (No. 04 Civ. 5669
(LAP)).
275. Conn. v. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
276. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B (1) (AM. LAW INST. 1979).
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the defendant and the type of injury received by the plaintiff. 277 In that sense, it is
not so much a policy determination of what level of CO 2 in the atmosphere, given
numerous economic, social, and political factors, is reasonable; rather, it is a
common-place judicial assessment of whether the defendant’s conduct created an
unreasonable risk to the plaintiffs. 278
V. CONCLUSION
A cause of action rooted in common law negligence brought by private
plaintiffs would be the most effective means of providing individuals with relief
and deterring future misconduct. Just as Big Tobacco could no longer defend itself
by decrying the personal responsibility of the smoker, 279 Big Oil should no longer
be able to deny, downplay, or shift the blame for global warming onto people who
drive cars, buy commercially manufactured sneakers, or use plastic. Not only has
it concealed the dangerous nature of these activities, 280 but it has also purposefully
confused the public using political and media bribery. 281 It has rendered our system
of government disloyal to the American people, and the planet itself. This
emblematic coup d’état by Big Oil forecloses the normal channels of legislative
and executive regulation, at least for the foreseeable future, and necessitates
alternative methods of accountability by the people themselves.

277. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 104 (N.Y. 1928).
278. Id.
279. Hite v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 578 A.2d 417 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1990) (arguing that people who
smoked cigarettes were doing so at their own risk, despite the fact that the risks are better known to the public).
280. See Milman, supra note 3.
281. See MIT W. HEMISPHERE PROJECT, supra note 34 (commenting on governmental misrepresentation
of science in the climate change context).
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